Between Security and Democracy: Defining Subversion and the Powers of the Israel Security Agency (ISA) During Election Periods
Dr. Avner Barnea
Center for National Security Studies, University of Haifa
Former Senior Official, Israel Security Agency (ISA)
This is a translation into English of my short article published today, July 26, 2026, in Zman Israel, https://www.zman.co.il/706821/
The General Security Service Law (2002) assigns the ISA responsibility for preventing “subversion”, yet it does not define what constitutes subversion. For years, the term remained ambiguous until, in 2009, the Israeli Supreme Court adopted a definition proposed by the ISA itself. This definition has significant implications for the agency’s authority boundaries, particularly during election periods, when any security-related action may be interpreted as having political significance.
Public debate has recently intensified following reports that the ISA intended to summon journalists for questioning as part of an investigation into security leaks, alongside allegations of surveillance of journalists and political activists. At the same time, an affidavit submitted by former ISA Director Ronen Bar stated that he had refused a request to monitor protest activists because he believed it unlawful, highlighting concerns about the possible misuse of the agency’s unique capabilities in the political arena. During election campaigns, these concerns become even more acute, as any exercise of security powers against public actors may affect public discourse, freedom of expression, and public confidence in the democratic process.
The subversion clause in the ISA Law presents a particular legal difficulty because the legislature never defined the term. It was only in the course of a petition before the Supreme Court that the Court adopted the ISA’s definition, according to which subversion is:
“Activity, including non-violent activity, that contains clandestine elements and is motivated by ideological considerations or by the interests of foreign actors, whose purpose or likely result is the commission of an offense, a threat to state security, harm to the democratic regime or its institutions, or damage to other vital national security interests as determined by the State pursuant to the General Security Service Law.”
This definition significantly broadened the ISA’s operational scope. It permits the agency to address even non-violent ideological activity if it is perceived as having the potential to harm state security or the democratic system. In practice, this is an administrative interpretation endorsed by judicial precedent but not explicitly anchored in legislation, leaving considerable ambiguity regarding the limits of the agency’s authority.
In 2013, the Supreme Court also considered the legality of the ISA’s warning conversations with political activists. The Court recognized that, under certain circumstances, citizens may be summoned to informal meetings where there is concern about subversive activity with security implications. However, it emphasized that this authority is subject to legal constraints and the principle of proportionality. According to the ISA’s own position, these conversations are not intended to address political protest as such, but only situations involving a genuine concern about unlawful activity that may threaten state security.
Nevertheless, several fundamental problems remain.
First, the public cannot know in advance precisely what constitutes the “subversion” on which the ISA bases the exercise of its powers. In a state governed by the rule of law, citizens should be able to know which actions are prohibited. When the relevant criteria remain undisclosed, legal certainty is seriously undermined.
Second, the very existence of such an ambiguous concept as “subversion” risks subjecting legitimate political activity to the scrutiny of a secret security service rather than to ordinary law-enforcement mechanisms.
A further concern relates to the warning conversations themselves. Individuals summoned to such meetings do not enjoy the procedural safeguards afforded to criminal suspects, yet being summoned by the security service may have a chilling effect, discouraging the exercise of freedom of expression and the right to protest. Where the limits of authority remain unclear, the mere exercise of these powers may deter legitimate public activity.
International comparison demonstrates that other democracies have chosen to narrow the use of the concept of subversion. In the United Kingdom, for example, the domestic security service no longer treats “subversion” as an independent operational category. Instead, it focuses on concrete threats to the democratic order, such as terrorism, espionage, and politically motivated violence. This approach reduces the risk of expanding security powers through an overly broad interpretation of ideological activity.
Several conclusions follow.
First, the definition of subversion should be established explicitly in legislation rather than relying on an administrative interpretation adopted by judicial precedent.
Second, clear statutory criteria should govern the exercise of ISA powers in relation to political activity, particularly during election periods.
Third, robust public, parliamentary, and judicial oversight should be ensured over the agency’s use of its covert authorities.
There is no dispute that a democratic state must protect itself against terrorism, espionage, foreign interference, and attempts to undermine the democratic system. However, safeguarding democracy also requires limiting the powers of security agencies. The more ambiguous the concept of subversion remains, the greater the risk that efforts to defend democracy will themselves erode the fundamental rights they are intended to protect.
Accordingly, the central question is not whether the ISA should address threats to the democratic regime, but rather what the limits of its authority should be and how its exercise should be supervised. During election periods, these limits become particularly important. The ISA should concentrate its activities on cases involving concrete indications of terrorism, espionage, violence, or other security-related offenses, while avoiding, as far as possible, involvement in ideological or political activity that does not cross a clear national security threshold. Only in this way can the protection of national security be reconciled with the protection of democracy.

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